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CATECHISM OR IMAGINATION: IS JUSTICE SCALIA'S

JUDICIAL STYLE TYPICALLY CATHOLIC?
DONALD

I.

L.

BESCHLE*

INTRODUCTION

W

HEN Clarence Thomas was nominated to the Supreme
Court, much attention was paid to his early Roman Catholic
education and upbringing.' Despite the ambiguous status of his
current relationship with the church, 2 he was labelled as a Catholic nominee. This label was significant to some, perhaps none
more so than Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, who suggested
that such a religious affiliation was problematic. 3 The context of
Governor Wilder's statement indicates specific concern with the
effect of Thomas's religion on his attitudes towards abortion.
Long before the emergence of the abortion issue, however, some
have seen membership in the Catholic Church as reason to op4
pose, or at least be wary of, Supreme Court nominees.
* Associate Professor, the John Marshall Law School. B.A., Fordham University; J.D., New York University; L.L.M., Temple University.
1. Hundreds of articles have highlighted Justice Thomas' Catholic education. See, e.g., Seymour P. Lachman & Barry A. Kosmin, Black Catholics Get Ahead,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1991, at 19; R.L. May, Thomas'Religion Looms As Issue, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 21, 1991, at Al; Carolyn Pesce & Kimberly H. Taylor,
From Humble Roots, Path Leads to High Court, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 1991, at 2A.
Probably never before has a Supreme Court nominee's elementary education
been as much a subject of discussion as his legal education. For example, a nun
who taught Justice Thomas testified on his behalf at the confirmation hearings.
See Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Is Unsuitable, Four Academics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1991, at A16.
2. Justice Thomas currently attends services at an Episcopalian church with
evangelical leanings. See Laura Blumenfeld, The Nominee's Soul Mate: Clarence
Thomas's Wife Shares His Ideas, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1991, at Fl.
3. After provoking a flurry of criticism, Governor Wilder apologized for his
impolitic remark. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Virginia LeaderApologizesfor Remark
on Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1991, at A6; see, e.g., There Is A Line and Wilder
Stepped Over It, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,July 10, 1991, at A8; They Have No Excusefor
Anti-Catholic Bias, NEWSDAY, July 22, 1991, at 34.
Not all commentators agreed that the religious question was inappropriate.
See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Catholic Hierarchy,Not Liberals, CreatedProblemfor Thomas,
CHI. TRIB., July 14, 1991, at C6 (asserting legitamacy of religious concerns because "bishops consistently tell Catholic officeholders how to vote" on abortion
issue); Martin Schram, When Religion, Sadly, Becomes an Issue, NEWSDAY, July 11,
1991, at 92 (declaring that Catholic Church's recent pressures on Catholic officeholders to vote pro-choice makes religion legitimate concern).
4. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil
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Aside from simple hostility toward those who are "different," 5 what gives rise to such opposition? Presumably, Catholicism must, in the views of some, be a useful tool to predict
judicial performance. In its least sophisticated form, this is simply
a matter of outcomes. If a nominee's church opposes legal abortion, the nominee is expected to do the same in his or her judicial
role. A nominee's church seeks government funds to support its
schools, therefore, the nominee is expected to uphold such aid
against constitutional challenge. To many citizens, almost certainly including some lawyers (and perhaps Governor Wilder?)
this is the source of the problem. But it is unlikely that this entirely explains it.
Catholicism was an issue long before obvious church-state issues emerged as a significant part of the Court's work. 6 And, if
Catholicism is merely a way of giving some insight into specific
positions, why aren't other denominations regarded in the same
way? One can hardly imagine the denominational affiliation of a
Protestant nominee being thought significant; indeed, how many
law professors, let alone citizens at large, could even identify the
religious affiliations of the Court's non-Catholics? 7 Catholicism
must be seen by some as more than merely a predictor of a few
discrete votes. Is it likely that it also predicts a distinctive way of
judging which, apart from outcomes, might be cause for concern?
The crudest formulation of an affirmative response to this
question would be the contention that Catholic judges, as well as
other Catholics in government positions, are subservient to speReligion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047 (1990) (examining
implications of religious orientation on judicial interpretation of Constitution).
5. "[T]o be considered different can mean being stigmatized or penalized."
Id. at 1053 (quoting Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1154 (1986)). For
this reason, members of minority groups will often assert their essential "sameness" to the majority while simultaneously asserting the legitimacy of their "difference." Id. at 1052-53.
6. See generallyJohn T. Noonan, The CatholicJustices of the United States Supreme
Court, 67 CATH. HIST. REV. 369 (1981) (discussing impact of Catholicism on judicial appointments of five Catholic Justices); Barbara A. Perry, The Life and Death
of the "Catholic Seat" on the United States Supreme Court, 6 J.L. & POL. 55 (1989)
(discussing religion factor in confirmation of six Catholic Justices over past two
centuries).
7. When they provided official biographies to a publication describing the
federal judiciary, several of the Justices listed their religious affiliation. See THE
AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Marie T. Hough et al. eds., 6th ed.
1991-1992). ChiefJustice Rehnquist lists his religious affiliation as Lutheran, id.
at 67; Justice Blackmun as Methodist, id. at 15; Justice O'Connor as Protestant,
id. at 61; and Justice Souter as Episcopalian. Id. at 74. Justices White and Stevens give no information concerning religious affiliation.
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cific instructions of religious leaders, particularly the Pope, in a
way in which other believers are not. 8 This notion of subservience to a "foreign prince" has a long history, 9 was an explicit subject of discussion at least until 196010 and still exists to some
extent in popular opinion,II but is hardly likely to be given much
credence by serious commentators today.
The next type of response might be that Catholicism makes it
more likely that the judge will override positive law in furtherance
of moral commands.' 2 As Howard Vogel has pointed out, however, if this is a matter of concern, it poses the same dilemma
when the nominee is one whose personal moral commitments
may conflict with a commitment to support the Constitution,' 3 regardless of whether the commitment is based in Catholicism, another religious belief or a strongly held secular-based morality.
Thus, while the role of a judge's personal moral commitments in
his or her judicial work is a matter for serious debate, there would
seem to be little reason to see it as a question which turns on
denominational affiliation.
Apart from specific outcomes, apart from the nativist nonsense about Catholic judges "taking orders from the Pope," apart
8. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 1062-69 (discussing questions concerning
role of Catholic Church's moral position in matters of public concern raised during confirmation hearings of Justices Brennan, Kennedy and Scalia).
9. Id. at 1067-69.
10. Thus, while mainstream editorial voices were critical of the use of religion as an issue in the debate overJustice Thomas, during the 1960 presidential
campaign, John Kennedy found it necessary to publicly proclaim his independence from "outside religious pressures." See id at 1055. For a discussion of
the debate over Justice Thomas, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
11. Andrew Greeley has found that "a quarter of Americans believe that
Catholics do not think for themselves and do whatever their leaders tell them."
ANDREW M. GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC MYTH: THE BEHAVIOR AND BELIEFS OF
AMERICAN CATHOLICS 3 n.1 (1990).

DuringJustice Thomas' confirmation hear-

ings, an advertising campaign in Washington, D.C. suggested that he would be
subject to papal influence. See Laura S. Stepp, Archdiocese Asks Metro to Pull Advertisements, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1991, at C6 (discussing ads that appeared during
confirmation hearings in Metrorail cars entitled "Who's Really Pulling the
Strings?").
12. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 1069-80 (questioning how "the traditional
Catholic emphasis on natural law and natural justice and the propensity to judge
the commands of positive law against the purported claims of natural law" affects Catholic Supreme Court Justices).
13. See HowardJ. Vogel, TheJudicial Oath and the American Creed: Comments on
Sanford Levinson's "The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics
Becoming Justices", 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 1116 (1990) (stating that concern
over religion of Catholic Justices can be extended to "all judicial nominees who
hold personal moral commitments regardless of whether such commitments are
religiously grounded or not").
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from the clash between positive law and morality faced by any
judge with personal moral commitments, is there any reason to
think that there might be something distinctive about the way in
which an American Catholic might approach the task of judging?
George Kannar suggests that there might be in his recent comment on the jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia.' 4
Kannar believes that Justice Scalia's commitment to textualism, and to the related principle of certainty of outcomes, can
largely be traced to his Catholic upbringing. 15 On the surface, of
course, this conflicts with commonly accepted notions of what distinguishes Catholic from Protestant theology; Protestants, after
all, emphasize religious texts, while Catholics are more attuned to
tradition. 16 But Kannar contends that such theory is less significant than "[t]he experience of growing up Catholic in pre-Vatican
II America."1 7 It is this experience, exemplified by the Baltimore
Catechism,'8 which molded Justice Scalia, and presumably other
Catholics, toward a more literalist "world of quaint legalisms."' 9
Is Justice Scalia's analytical style typically Catholic? Or, in
fact, is it one which, while no doubt used by many Catholics, lawyers and non-lawyers, is less representative of Catholic than nonCatholic thought? Rather than attempting to address these questions by exploring a range of Catholic theological writing, this Article will proceed in a more empirical way. The subject, after all,
is not normative; I do not propose to decide whether Justice
Scalia, or anyone else, is an exemplar of "good" or "true" Catholic thought. Instead, I will take Justice Scalia and another Catholic jurist who might be seen as his antithesis, Justice Frank
14. See George Kannar, The ConstitutionalCatechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
L.J. 1297, 1300 (1990) (hypothesizing that as an American Catholic, Justice
Scalia's attempt to reconcile "his personal moral views with his worldly participation" influences his constitutional perspective and adjudication).
15. Id. at 1309-20.
16. Thus, in theoretical terms, Kannar states that "if any of the Catholic
Justices has adhered to a Thomist analytic construct in approaching moral issues, it is easier to make the case that his name is Brennan, not Scalia." Id. at
1312.
17. Id. at 1314. Kannar goes on to state that "a more fruitful route toward
understanding Justice Scalia's jurisprudential world-view may lie not in 'High
Church' theological discussions, but in the testimony of fellow pre-Vatican II
American Catholics." Id. at 1313.
18. The Baltimore Catechism, a text presenting church doctrine in question
and answer format, "remained the staple of the Catholic Sunday school and of
children's religious instruction in general" until the 1960's. Id. at 1313 n.80
(quoting JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE 391 (1985)).

19. Id. at 1314 (quoting

GARRY WILLS,

PROPHECY, AND RADICAL RELIGION

BARE RUINED CHOIRS: DOUBT,

35 (1972)).
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Murphy, and measure their styles against the empirical work done
by Andrew Greeley and others in exploring the question of
whether there is a distinctive Catholic style of thought. In the
final analysis, it may be Justice Murphy, rather than justice Scalia,
who is more representative of what is distinctive about Catholic
styles of thinking.
Does any of this matter, except perhaps to the devotee of
Supreme Court history? I think it does. As long as people use
religious affiliation as a predictor of likely judicial behavior, they
should at least have some indication of what that affiliation is
likely to indicate. Of course, not all co-religionists think alike; no
one would contend that all Catholic judges will share Justice Murphy's analytical style. But, consciously or unconsciously, many
may come to believe that Justice Scalia, currently America's most
prominent Catholic jurist, provides the most likely model of a
Catholic judicial style.2 0 Testing the validity of this assumption is,
therefore, a worthwhile endeavor.
II.

Two CATHOLIC JUSTICES

Anyone who proposes to explore the proposition that there
is a distinctive style of thinking more likely to appear in the work
of Catholics, and in particular Catholic judges, might immediately
be discouraged from pursuing the notion by a brief examination
of the lives and work of Justices Frank Murphy and Antonin
Scalia. Aside from their Catholicism, one would be hard pressed
to find two Supreme Court Justices who seem less similar.
A. Justice Scalia
Antonin Scalia was born in 1936 in Trenton, NewJersey, the
son of Italian immigrants. His father was a professor of Romance
languages; his mother, an elementary school teacher. His family
moved to New York when he was a child. He attended St. Francis
Xavier High School, in Manhattan, and Georgetown University, in
Washington, D.C. At both schools he was at the top of his class.
After his 1960 graduation from Harvard Law School, he spent
20. The tendency of the public to project the views of a particular Catholic
on most other Catholics would not be a new phenomenon. Thus, it was widely
believed during the 1950s that most Catholics, like Senator Joseph McCarthy,
were hawkish anti-communists with less of a commitment to civil liberties than
other Americans. Surveys indicate, however, that this view was incorrect. See
ANDREW M. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT 90-111
(1977) (discussing surveys that indicate that "Catholics are at least as libertarian
as Protestants").
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eight years with a Cleveland law firm, taught at the University of
Virginia, held a number of positions in the White House and Justice Department during the Nixon and Ford administrations, and
returned to teaching in 1977 at the University of Chicago. By
1982, he had become a well known conservative academic voice,
with special expertise in administrative law and regulatory issues. 2 ' He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1982, and to the Supreme
Court in 1986.22
When Justice Scalia was appointed, he was expected to be a
strong conservative. 23 Many also thought that, largely based
upon his personal gregariousness, he would be able to build a
coherent conservative majority.2 4 These predictions have proven
only partially correct. For the most part, Justice Scalia's votes
have favored positions endorsed by political conservatives, but he
has not become a consensus builder; rather, he has become somewhat of a controversial figure even among conservatives. 2 5 This
is due to his strong and sometimes personal attacks on what
might be called the cautious conservative faction on the Court,
most notably Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. 26 Almost invariably,
this split is triggered by Justice Scalia's dogged insistence on following some principle to its extreme, while the more cautious
conservatives prefer to temporize or leave for another day diffi21. James E. Wyszynski, Comment, In PraiseofJudicial Restraint: The Jurisprudence ofJusticeAntonin Scalia, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 117, 129-31 (discussing Justice
Scalia's background and education).
22. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's work on the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, see Richard Nagareda, Note, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 705 (1987).
23. For examples of typical assessments at the time of Justice Scalia's appointment, see Paul Marcotte, New Kid on the Block, 72 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1986, at 20
(commenting that "Scalia's conservative views on abortion, affirmative action,
criminal procedure, and the limited role of the courts in setting public policy
mirror those of the Reagan administration"); David 0. Stewart, What's Ahead with
Rehnquist and Scalia?, 72 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1986, at 36 (discussing Justice Scalia's
views).
24. Typical was the comment of Professor Geoffrey Stone, a former colleague of Scalia at the University of Chicago: "He has the personal skills, intelligence, patience and manner to work out compromises and find common
ground." Marcotte, supra note 23, at 20; see also Wyszynski, Comment, supra note
21, at 131 n.69 (opining that "Scalia was not a typical 'right-wing sourpuss,' but
an ebullient, easy-going individual.").
25. See Linda Greenhouse, Court's Consensus Marred By Infighting, 135 CHI.
DAILY L. BULL.,July 28, 1989, at 1, 14 (noting thatJustice O'Connor is "particularly perturbed by Justice Scalia's verbal slings"); Richard C. Reuben, Scalia Is
Still Taking Shots at O'Connor, 104 L.A. DAILY J., May 21, 1991, at 7 (noting
Scalia's "brutal judicial assaults" on Justice O'Connor).
26. See Greenhouse, supra note 25, at 1; Reuben, supra note 25, at 7.
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cult issues unessential to the disposition of the case before the
27
Court.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with him, one must concede
thatJustice Scalia has become a significant figure in contemporary
jurisprudence. As a Justice with a relatively consistent approach
to legal analysis, he has been the subject of much scholarly commentary, 2 8 but it is largely unnecessary to turn to the commentary
except to elaborate on Justice Scalia's own explanation of his approach. 29 He has often stated that he sees clarity, precision and
predictability as essential elements of the law. 30 While conceding
the relevance of morality to law, he minimizes their interdependence: "Fortunately . . . the overwhelming majority of issues of
public policy do not rise to the moral level." 31 Where morality is
relevant, it would seem to be so only for the voter, legislator and,
perhaps, common-law judge. As an interpreter of statutes and
32
constitutional provisions, Justice Scalia is a positivist.
As commentators have noted, Justice Scalia's commitment to
textualism, clarity and predictability has been relatively consistent
across different areas of substantive law, and in some instances,
has led him to conclusions at odds with political conservatives. 3 3
Thus, he has been unwilling to extend the meaning of "confron27. See Linda Greenhouse, Changed Pathfor Court? New Balance Held by 3 Cautious Justices, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at 1 (noting "hesitancy to overturn
precedents" and "distaste for aggressive arguments" of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter); Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk: In Surprise, High Court
Seems Less Solid, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at A18 (noting fragmentation and
"underlying tension" within Court's conservative majority).
28. See, e.g., Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583 (1991).
29. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 581 (1990); Antonin Scalia,Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and
the Legal Order, 9 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
30. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 29 (asserting that
"rudimentary justice" requires predictability).
31. Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, supra note 29, at 123.
32. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 29, at 1187 (urging that "the Rule of law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the
question allows"); see also Beau J. Brock, Comment, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A
Renaissanceof Positivism and Predictabilityin ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 LA. L. REV.
623 (1991) (linking Scalia's theory of law to "modern American positivism").
33. See Kannar, supra note 14, at 1299 (discussing "cases in which the Justice has upset ordinary political expectations by reaching 'liberal' conclusions");
David Boling, Comment, The JurisprudentialApproach ofJustice Antonin Scalia: Methodology Over Results? 44 ARK. L. REV. 1143 (1991) (discussing Justice Scalia's constitutional methodology).
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tation" in the Sixth Amendment to permit steps to protect child
witnesses from face-to-face encounters with criminal defendants.3 4 He has insisted upon a sharp distinction between a
"search" and the observation of an item in "plain view," rejecting
the contention of law enforcement officials that lifting an item of
audio equipment to check its serial number did not exceed the
bounds of "plain view" observation. 3 5 Additionally, while not
writing an opinion, he provided the deciding vote to strike down
flag desecration statutes when, as Justice Kennedy pointed out,
36
precedent quite clearly called for such an outcome.
More often, however, his distaste for "balancing" tests and
preference for clear outcomes has led to the rejection of individual rights claims. Thus, the Eighth Amendment, in Justice
Scalia's view, has little to say about prison guards arbitrarily beating prisoners; it speaks almost exclusively to the legitimacy of the
"punishment" imposed by the state's sentence.3 7 In the notoriously imprecise world of substantive due process, Justice Scalia
strongly rejects overturning legislative judgments except in cases
in which the government infringes on a specific right traditionally
recognized by society; 38 in practice, this seems to draw a bright
line which protects only traditional families engaged in traditional
activities. 3 9 Justice Scalia has gone out of his way to belittle at34. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (stating that "[i]t is a truism that constitutional protections have costs").
35. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (noting that "[the] distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it
even a few inches is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment").
36. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (indicating that "nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by
prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it").
37. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined injustice Thomas' dissent which, after noting that
traditionally the amendment was not used to regulate prison administration, did
allow an exception if the injuries inflicted were both "serious" and inflicted with
a "culpable" state of mind. Id. at 1006. To Justices Thomas and Scalia, punches
and kicks that loosened the inmate's teeth, cracked his partial dental plate and
caused swelling of the face, mouth and lip did not reach that level. Id. at 1005.
38. Thus, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Justice Scalia
addressing the right to die, stated that "the federal courts have no business in
this field." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Furthermore, since 1989, Justice Scalia has explicitly called for the overruling of Roe v. Wade. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2873 (1992) (Scalia,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
39. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In Michael H.,Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected the extension of due process familial rights
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tempts, particularly by Justice O'Connor, to enunciate some middle ground in cases involving abortion and the asserted "right to
die," which would rely on balancing interests to determine
40
whether a state has imposed an "undue burden" on rights.
In various First Amendment contexts, Justice Scalia has continued to favor relative clarity over flexibility. Thus, in libel cases,
an assertion of fact will not lose that status by appearing in a context which, in its "totality," might be seen as an expression of
opinion. 4 1 The Free Exercise Clause protects only what is unambiguously religious: belief, prayer and proselytization. It gives no
special protection to activity such as the ingestion of peyote,
which might or might not, in individual cases, be a manifestation
42
of religious beliefs.
Apart from the analysis of individual rights claims, Justice
Scalia has also championed clear lines and strong textualism in
matters of separation of powers and statutory interpretation. For
example, when text and history indicate that initiating criminal
prosecutions is an executive function, then that function must be
exercised only by officials who are fully responsible to executive
authority, even if the target of the investigation is an executive
officer. 4 3 Arguments that this conclusion undermines the general
purpose of separation of powers, which is to prevent unreasonable accumulations of power in any branch of government,
although persuasive to all other members of the Court, do not
sway Justice Scalia. 44 He also has become the leading advocate
to a father of a child conceived during an adulterous affair. Id. at 124. Constitutional protection should turn on whether the relationship "has been treated as a
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society." Id.
40. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292-301 (ScaliaJ., concurring)); Webster, 492
U.S. at 532-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
41. See Milkovich v. Lorain journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (noting that
"expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact"). In
Milkovich, Justice Scalia joined in the majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2.
42. Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In
Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected the need for any free exercise balancing test when a statute did not "compel affirmation of religious belief,
punish the expression of religious doctrines, impose special disabilities on the
basis of religious views, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma." Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
43. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia was the only member of the Court to maintain that the office of a
special prosecutor, not fully subordinate to executive officers, could not be created to carry out the "purely executive power" of prosecuting members of the
executive branch. Id.
44. For a concise statement of the arguments in favor of the special prose-
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for minimizing the role of legislative history, with all of its potential ambiguity, in the process of statutory interpretation.
Although recourse to legislative history might sometimes be necessary, the favored set of tools for statutory interpretation should
45
be limited to the text and a dictionary.
Thus, outcomes aside, we have an unusually coherent example of judicial philosophy and style. Justice Scalia is a judicial
positivist. Judges, he believes, should not be in the business of
making policy decisions; rather, they interpret. Perhaps the most
important obligations of the interpreter are clarity and precision;
the greatest pitfall is ambiguity. Surely, Professor Kannar's characterization ofJustice Scalia's work as reflecting "a profoundly dichotomous world view ' ' 46 seems essentially correct. If the goal is
to be clear, then the means must be likewise, leading to "a tendency toward analytic rigidity and a limited tolerance for ad hoc
47
policy-making.",
For the most part, even those who strongly disagree with Justice Scalia express admiration for his intellect, his powers of reasoning and expression and his consistency. 48 In this regard, as
well as many others, we will find sharp contrasts when we compare this profile of contemporary America's most prominent
cutor law, based on the contention that the primary evil to be guarded against by
separation of powers was excessive concentration of government power in any
one branch of government, see Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, The
Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison v. Olson: A Common Sense Application of the
Constitution to a PracticalProblem, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 359 (1989).
45. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)
(noting that Justice Scalia considers legislative history irrelevant to determination of plain meaning of statute); Arthur Stock, Note,Justice Scalia's Use of Sources
in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 160 (stating that Justice Scalia applies "textualist" approach to statutes;
"originalist" approach to Constitution).
46. Kannar, supra note 14, at 1323.
47. Id. at 1339.
48. A good example of this can be seen in the comments of Professor Geoffrey Stone. See Marcotte, supra note 23, at 20. Gerald Gunther has described
Justice Scalia as "bright as hell" and Alan Dershowitz has paid him the backhanded compliment of being "[one] of the finest 19th-century minds in
America." Jean M. Meaux, Comment, Justice Scalia andJudicial Restraint: A Conservative Resolution of Conflict Between Individualand State, 62 TUL. L. REV. 225, 228
n.20, 229 n.27 (1987). Those ideologically closer to Justice Scalia, of course, are
even less restrained. Judge Alex Kozinski likens Justice Scalia to Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Harlan, and predicts that Justice Scalia "will take his place
among the Court's giants." Alex Kozinski, My Pizza With Nino, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1583, 1591 (1991). A recent NEXIS search of newspaper articles containing the words "Scalia" and "brilliant" turned up 119 citations. Search of NEXIS
(August 1992).
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Catholic jurist with one of the half-dozen Catholics who preceded
him on the Court.
B. Justice Murphy
Frank Murphy was born in 1890, in Harbor Beach, Michigan.
His father was a lawyer, an active Democrat in a predominantly
Republican community, and an ardent advocate of Irish national
causes. 4 9 His mother, also Irish-American, is credited with instilling a deep religious piety in her son, who was formally educated
in public schools. 50 Murphy received a B.A. and an L.L.B. from
the University of Michigan, and after military service in World
War I and a brief period of advanced legal studies in London and
Dublin, he became an Assistant United States Attorney in
Detroit. 5 1
In 1923, he was elected judge of the Recorder's Court, a Detroit criminal court. He quickly developed a reputation as a progressive trial judge, using the findings of sociologists and
psychiatrists to assist him in sentencing decisions, and gaining
widespread praise for his work in presiding over a racially
charged murder trial in which a black physician, who had killed a
member of a white mob attacking his house, was acquitted. 52 He
was elected Mayor of Detroit in 1930, and became a strong advocate of federal assistance to cities to relieve the pain caused by the
53
Depression.
A strong supporter of Franklin Roosevelt, Murphy was appointed Governor General of the Philippines in 1933, where he
saw his task as moving the islands toward self-rule. In 1936, at
the urging of President Roosevelt, Murphy resigned to run for
Governor of Michigan, and he was elected. 54 He was immediately
faced with the need to deal with a wave of sit-down strikes against
49. Albon P. Man, Mr. Justice Murphy and the Supreme Court, 36 VA. L. REV.
889, 891 (1950). The definitive biography ofJustice Murphy is the three-volume

work of Sidney Fine. See

SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE DETROIT YEARS
SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE NEW DEAL YEARS (1979); SIDNEY FINE,
FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS (1989).

(1975);

50. Man, supra note 49, at 891-92.
51. Id. at 892-93.
52. Id. at 893-94. The defense of Dr. Ossian Sweet and his relatives was
undertaken by Clarence Darrow in what was to be his last high-profile case
before retiring from active legal practice. See James W. McElhaney, The Trial of
Henry Sweet, 78 A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 73.
53. See Thurman W. Arnold, Comment, Mr. Justice Murphy, 63 HARV. L. REV.
289, 290 (1949) (stating that "Murphy determined that no one in Detroit should
starve because of lack of employment").
54. See Man, supra note 49, at 895-900.
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General Motors. General Motors had obtained court orders to
forcibly eject and arrest the workers, but Governor Murphy refused to dispatch the National Guard to enforce the order, insisting instead that the company and the United Auto Workers
engage in weeks of intense negotiations, which ended in a peace55
ful settlement.
Although praised by many for avoiding bloodshed, Governor
Murphy was widely condemned by the business community for
not using force to end the strikes. The polarization of attitudes
toward him can be seen in that even after his defeat for re-election in 1938, largely attributable to his pro-labor record, he was
still seriously discussed as a possible Democratic candidate for
President, should President Roosevelt step down in 1940.56 Immediately after his defeat for re-election, Murphy was appointed
United States Attorney General. In little over a year in that post,
he launched anti-corruption prosecutions, strongly supported the
antitrust policies of Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold,
and, perhaps most significantly, established the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice. 5 7 His speeches and writings
from this period stressed the need for government to respect
First Amendment rights and to fight discrimination against mi58
nority groups.
Following the death of Justice Pierce Butler (the Court's only
Catholic member at that time), Murphy was appointed to the
59
Supreme Court and confirmed by the Senate in January 1940.
He served until his death in 1949 at the relatively young age of
55. Id. In Thurman Arnold's words: "Governor Murphy was unable to see
the situation in the clear black and white of the law of trespass." See Arnold,
supra note 53, at 291.
56. See Man, supra note 49, at 900; see also Eugene Gressman, The Controversial Image of Mr. Justice Murphy, 47 GEO. L.J. 631, 632 & n.2 (1959) (noting that
James Farley believed that Justice Murphy was one of President Roosevelt's
three top choices to succeed him as President).
57. See Man, supra note 49, at 901-07; see also Thurgood Marshall, Mr. Justice
Murphy and Civil Rights, 48 MICH. L. REV. 745, 746 (1950) (praising Justice Murphy's dedication to American civil rights and opposition to "discriminatory governmental action").
58. For excerpts from his speeches as Attorney General, see MR. JUSTICE
MURPHY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 61-76 (H. Norris ed., 1965).
59. Man, supra note 49, at 907. Those who long for an antidote to today's
detailed and public confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees might
take a look at the only existing records of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Justice Murphy, which consist of six handwritten pages. See THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1975 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds.

1975).
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59.60 Not surprisingly, in light of his pre-court career, he staked
out a position as the most consistent civil libertarian among the
Justices. 6 1 Some of his most prominent positions, often taken in
dissent, have become well accepted, yet at the time were considered at best innovative, at worst radical. For example, Justice
Murphy dissented from the Court's refusal to hold that the Constitution required a state to appoint counsel to an indigent accused of a non-capital felony, 62 and from the Court's refusal to
apply the exclusionary rule to the states. 63 Over a decade later,
both positions would be adopted by the Court, 64 as would Justice
Murphy's dissenting view that the Fifth Amendment prevents a
state from allowing a jury to draw negative inferences from a
65
criminal defendant's refusal to testify.
Justice Murphy, who did not live to see Brown v. Board of Education,66 rejected narrow interpretations of statutes and concepts
such as "state action" as barriers to justify "the slightest refusal
6 7 His
... to expose and condemn [racism] whenever it appears."
strong support of equal protection rights led him not only to sup-

60. Man, supra note 49, at 913.
61. A tabulation of divided cases involving civil liberties claims during Justice Murphy's last three years on the Court shows that he voted in support of the
claimed right 53 times, against it three times. John P. Frank,Justice Murphy: The
Goals Attempted, 59 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1949). His consistent ally Justice Wiley Rutledge voted in favor of the right claimed 52 times, against four times. Id. Justice
Douglas voted for 47 and against 10 such claimed rights;Justice Black for 39 and
against 17. Id. All of the otherJustices supported significantly less than half of
these claims. Id.
62. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (BlackJ., dissenting), overruled
by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
63. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
64. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf).
65. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 123 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). A further example ofJustice Murphy's foresight in criminal procedure was his dissent in a case refusing
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to wiretapping. See Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). One commentator noted that "Murphy was prepared as early as ... 1948 ...to declare 'separate-but-equal' educational facilities unconstitutional." Michael E. Parrish, Book Review, 2 CONST. COMM. 463,
468 (1985) (reviewing SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS
(1984)).
67. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 209 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138 (1945)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that "those entrusted with authority shall [not]
be allowed to violate with impunity the clear constitutional rights of the inarticulate and the friendless").
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port claims by blacks, but perhaps even more strikingly, to
strongly defend the rights of Japanese-Americans during World
War J1.68 His dissent in Korematsu v. United States has not only
been largely vindicated by history, 69 but seems even more admirable in light of Justice Murphy's high regard for President
Roosevelt and the United States military in general, not to men70
tion his strong support of the war effort.
On First Amendment issues, Justice Murphy was as strongly
libertarian, but less likely to be relegated to the role of dissenter.
His first significant opinion for the Court, Thornhill v. Alabama, established that the act of picketing was entitled to First Amendment protection, rejecting a narrow reading of the constitutional
term "speech." 71 This decision would have significant impact on
later free speech jurisprudence. 72 His advocacy of using a strong
version of the "clear and present danger" test 7 3 foreshadowed
68. After his hesitant concurrence in Hirabayashiv. United States, which upheld curfew restrictions on Japanese-Americans living on the Pacific Coast in
early 1942,Justice Murphy wrote a strong dissent in Korematsu v. United States, the
now largely discredited case in which the removal ofJapanese-Americans to internment camps was upheld. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109
(1943) (Murphy,J., concurring); see also Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944)
(Murphy, J., concurring) (stating that "detention in Relocation Centers of persons ofJapanese ancestry ... is another example of the unconstitutional resort
to racism inherent in the entire evacuation program").
69. In 1988, Congress enacted an apology to Japanese-Americans for the
"evacuation, relocation and internment" enforced during World War II, and
provided for restitution payments. See 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988).
70. Justice Murphy sought commission as a combat officer in World War II;
his request was denied because of age. Man, supra note 49, at 908. Nevertheless, he took time during the summer of 1942 to receive three months of military
training. Id. He told the New York Times: "The Army is all right... I know, I
have seen it myself." Id. at 909. Further, "he insisted on wearing a military
uniform to the Court when the Justices met in Special Term to hear the pleas of
the Nazi saboteurs." Parrish, supra note 66, at 468. Nevertheless, he strongly
dissented from the Court's approval of the trial of General Yamashita for war
crimes by an American military tribunal after the war. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Fifth Amendment due process protection extended to those accused of war crimes, even enemy belligerents); see also Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944) (Murphy, J.) (holding
that evidence of intent was insufficient to find defendant in violation of Espionage Act of 1917, despite anti-war activities).
71. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
72. The acceptance of picketing as entitled to First Amendment protection
despite the fact that it contains elements of conduct paved the way for other
First Amendment cases. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying altered version of U.S. flag is protected expression); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing armbands is act entitled
to First Amendment protection).
73. See Bridges v.Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945) (Murphy,J., concurring)
(denying deportation of individual because former affiliation with organization
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Brandenburgv. Ohio,7 4 and surely indicates that he would have dissented in the now largely discredited 1951 Dennis v. United States7 5
case.
In several opinions, Justice Murphy clearly indicated that he
believed that there is independent force to the Free Exercise
Clause beyond the protection the remainder of the First Amendment provided to other speech. 76 While the Court endorsed this
position in the 1960s, the 1990 case of Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 7 7 severely undercut it. Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia wrote the Smith opinion. Justice Scalia's narrowing of
Free Exercise protection has been widely criticized, not merely by
liberal commentators, but also by some commentators generally
regarded as conservative. 78
Because Justice Murphy's views have been vindicated so
often, one might expect that he would be held in high regard, as a
"great dissenter" in the mold ofJustices Holmes and the firstJustice Harlan. 7 9 It is at least somewhat surprising that, unlike Jusadvocating overthrow of U.S. government did not represent clear and present
danger to public welfare); Hartzel, 322 U.S. at 687 (holding that clear and present danger "that the activities in question will bring about the substantive evils"
Congress sought to prevent is necessary element of Espionage Act violation).
74. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that Ohio law prohibiting advocacy of
forceful or illegal acts violated First and Fourteenth Amendments because advocacy did not necessarily produce imminent lawless action).
75. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (permitting prosecution of speech as crime even
when evil consequences are remote, if those consequences (overthrow of government) are sufficiently serious).
76. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing for exempting minors distributing religious literature from
child labor law);Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611-12 (1942) (Murphy,
J., dissenting) (advocating exempting religious materials from general revenue
tax on sale of literature), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948),Justice Murphy joined the majority
in striking down the practice of elective "release time" religious instruction in
public schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 210-11. This
vote brought him severe criticism from Catholic church leaders. See Man, supra
note 49, at 927-29.
77. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit
application of state drug laws to sacramental use of peyote).
78. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1420 (1990) (commenting that
"[t]he historical record casts doubt on [the Smith] interpretation of the free exercise clause").
79. Research by David Danelski indicates that of all the Justices of his era,
Justice Murphy was the one most likely to have cases in which he dissented ultimately overruled. This was not merely a function of an unusually high total
number of dissenting votes; Justices Douglas, Black and Frankfurter each dissented more often than Justice Murphy from 1940 to 1949. DanielJ. Danelski,
The Riddle of Frank Murphy's Personality and Jurisprudence, 13 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
189, 198 & n.51 (1988).
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tice Scalia, Justice Murphy was, and to some extent still is,
regarded as a judicial lightweight-at best a utopian who somehow stumbled onto correct outcomes, at worst "a New Deal political hack," 8 0 totally result oriented and unable to treat "the cases
presented as complex problems."''s Yet, in numerous unheralded
cases dealing with such matters as tax law, Justice Murphy displayed at least an average level of technical proficiency.8 2 Surely
the analytical style in his best-remembered opinions was consciously adopted, and not merely the result of an inability to comprehend alternatives.
How can Justice Murphy's philosophy and style of thought be
summarized? One might begin by simply constructing the antithesis to Justice Scalia's style and philosophy. Justice Murphy
worked with sympathy toward the natural law belief that "God
had endowed men with reason so that they could make their temporal law ... conform to natural right ....
Justice Murphy believed that the Court's duty was to build a system of law that both
men and government could follow with good conscience." 8 3 This
task could not be effectively undertaken through "complex dialectic," but rather through a commitment to fundamental values that
would override the value of technical precision.
ConsiderJustice Murphy's comments on statutory interpretation in a labor law case: "Such an issue can be resolved only by
discarding formalities and adopting a realistic attitude, recognizing that we are dealing with human beings and with a statute that
is intended to secure to them the fruits of their toil and exer80. John P. Roche, The Utopian Pilgrimageof Mr. Justice Murphy, 10 VAND. L.
369 (1957). The lightweight label given to Justice Murphy summarized "a
word-of-mouth tradition in law school circles that the Justice was a legal illiterate." Id.
81. Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 299 (1954); see
also Woodford Howard,Justice Murphy: The Freshman Years, 18 VAND. L. REV. 473,
473-74 (1965) ("[T]he Justice commonly has been pictured by his critics as a
man who followed militantly liberal predilections without faltering-and without
thought-from his first day on the Court to his last."). In sharp contrast tojustice Scalia, whose intellect is often praised even by his opponents, even friendly
comment about Justice Murphy has tended to be patronizing. See John P. Frank,
Justice Murphy: The Goals Attempted, 59 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1949) (commenting that
"[Justice] Murphy seemed to reach fairly happy results even though he lacked
proper concern for legal techniques"). Of course, there were and are some exceptions, such as the remarks of Thurgood Marshall and Thurman Arnold. For
Justice Marshall's remarks, see supra note 57. For Thurman Arnold's comments,
see supra note 53.
82. See Frank, supra note 81, at 3-4 & nn.15-16.
83. Arnold, Comment, supra note 53, at 289.
REV.
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tion." 8 4 Justice Roberts' response might be mistaken for a Scalia
pronouncement:
The question for decision in this case should be approached not on the basis of any broad humanitarian
prepossessions we may all entertain, not with the desire
to construe legislation so as to accomplish what we deem
worthy objects, but in the traditional and, if we are to
have a government of laws, the essential attitude of ascertaining what Congress has enacted rather than what
we wish it had enacted.8 5
Consider also Justice Murphy's statement: "The law knows no
finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimina'8 6
tion and persecution.
Such a philosophy is, of course, highly unlikely to produce an
abundance of clarity, and it might be criticized on those grounds.
Chief Justice Stone reluctantly assigned opinions to Justice Murphy, at one point stating that: "The job of the Court . ..is to
resolve doubts, not create them." '8 7 How then can the value that
Justice Murphy placed ahead of clarity and formalism be described? Eugene Gressman, a former law clerk to Justice Murphy,
characterized it as "judicial empathy," 88 the ability to be sensitive
to the views and feelings of disparate types of people, "to understand and accommodate competing interests" 8 9 and to frame a
legal world more inclusive of the haphazard diversity of the
American people. Gressman invokes Jerome Frank: "[A]ble
judges cannot live by rules alone.., a judge who knows nothing
but the rules will be ...a dispenser of injustice, since ... the art
of judging really lies in the ability to cope with the unruly." 90
Gressman further cites Frank for the proposition that a judge
should have
84. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123, 321 U.S. 590,
592 (1944).
85. Id. at 606 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
86. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
87. Roche, supra note 80, at 370 (quoting ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN
FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW

793 (1956)).

88. Gressman, supra note 56, at 637.
89. Id. at 643.
90. Id. at 647 n.42 (citing Jerome Frank, Book Review, 61
1113 (1952)).

YALE
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a poetic imagination, a sensitive awareness of the individual human beings involved in law suits [sic], and an
eagerness that their unique sayings and doings shall not
be ignored. His interest is in having justice done in each
case, not in contriving a neat system of rules to satisfy
the lazy or those with such callow sensibilities that only
smooth-flowing harmonies satisfy them. 9 '
To create a hypothetical jurist to set in contrast to Justice
Scalia, a better model than Justice Murphy could hardly be found.
Justice Murphy was as much a hero to liberals as Justice Scalia is
to conservatives. Justice Murphy's rejection of formalism and
predictability as paramount values, his empathy, inclusiveness
and "poetic imagination" stand in contrast to Justice Scalia's positivism, commitment to precision and "profoundly dichotomous"
style. Yet each was a pre-Vatican II Catholic and, by all accounts,
92 Is
each grew to regard religion as an important part of his life.
one of their styles more typically Catholic than the other? Or can
it be concluded that there is simply no style of thinking more typically Catholic than others?
III.

Is

THERE A DISTINCTIVELY CATHOLIC STYLE OF THOUGHT?

Observers of the lives of Justice Murphy and Justice Scalia
agree that for both men, Catholicism was a significant part of
their lives, and not merely a nominal affiliation. 93 If this can be
true of two Justices so otherwise different, one might be led to
discount the connection between religious commitment and jurisprudence. Yet it seems strange that strongly held beliefs about
ultimate values would not influence a Justice's work. Commentators have viewed Justice Murphy's jurisprudence as largely based
91. Gressman, supra note 56, at 638 (citing Jerome Frank, Book Review, 61
LJ. 1108, 1112 (1952)).
92. Justice Murphy "took his religious duties seriously" and is said "to have
spent at least an hour [a day] reading the ... Bible." Man, supra note 49, at 892.
Justice Scalia has commented on the continuing effect of Catholicism on his life.
See Kannar, supra note 14, at 1318-19.
93. For a discussion of the significance of Catholicism in the lives ofJustices
Murphy and Scalia, see supra note 92 and accompanying text. Occasionally, distinctly Catholic references appeared in both Justices' opinions. For an example,
see Justice Scalia's reference to St. Jude in United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2111 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). Perhaps more
interesting, because it is less obviously self-conscious, is Justice Murphy's characterization of deportation as "being excommunicated." Bridges v. Wixson, 326
U.S. 135, 159 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
YALE
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in Catholic thought. 9 4 Yet Professor Kannar views Justice Scalia's
95
very different approach as grounded in his Catholic education.
Kannar's explanation for the apparent contradiction is that a
difference exists between the most sophisticated levels of a
church's theology and the ways those teachings are presented to,
and understood by, the typical church member. 9 6 Thus, while the
Catholic theologian may appreciate, say, Aquinas' argument for
the ultimate primacy of individual conscience, the average church
member is likely to believe that the magisterium is simply to be
obeyed. 97 While the theologian or church historian understands
that the primacy of texts is more closely associated with Protestant than Catholic thought, the normal Catholic layperson, particularly those educated before the reforms of the Second Vatican
Council, is likely to think that unambiguous answers are found in
texts, and not merely the Bible itself, but such manuals as that
classic tool of American Catholic education, the Baltimore
Catechism.98

The notion is intriguing-perhaps examining the way actual
Catholic lay people think might be more fruitful than examining
the work of theologians. However, Professor Kannar provides
only anecdotal evidence that Justice Scalia's rigorous adherence
to text and "profoundly dichotomous world view" are, in fact,
94. See James A. Jolly, The Social Philosophy of Frank Murphy, 42 U. DET. L.J.
585, 586 (1965) (stating that "Catholicism instilled convictions that there was a
moral basis to social relationships, that faith of itself was insufficient unless accompanied by works, and that crass, rugged individualism and a greedy pursuit
of profit are improper"); Roche, supra note 80, at 377 (stating that "Murphy's
anti-traditionalism thus itself stemmed from a tradition traceable through St.
Thomas Aquinas to Aristotle"). Focusing only on specific outcomes, specifically
Justice Murphy's vote in McCollum v. Board of Education, however, leads to the
same conclusion formed by John Frank: "We may deduce that the principles
guiding his decisions were quite apart from his Catholicism." Frank, supra note
81, at 3; see also McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
95. Kannar, supra note 14, at 1313-14.
96. Id. Kannar does stress that he does not mean "to account for the views
of all Catholics." Id. at 1313 n.83. The discussion does proceed, however, as if
the legalistic, literalistic view is to be regarded as the norm, and cases such as
Justice Brennan are to be regarded as the exception. Id. at 1313-14 & n.83.
Kannar uses the example of Robert Kennedy, beginning his public career as
"self-righteously harsh," but evolving over time. Id. at 1313 n.83. The implication is that Kennedy and others moved somehow away from typical Catholic
thought; in Kennedy's case "to Greek tragedians and Albert Camus." Id.
97. Id. at 1313 & n.80.
98. Id.; see also JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE 441
(1985) (stating that "the clarity and precision of the Baltimore Catechism era has
given way to less precise, popular expressions of theological truths"). For a further discussion of the Baltimore Catechism, see supra note 18.
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more typical of actual Catholic thought than alternative styles. 99
Recently, a body of data has been developed, primarily by Andrew Greeley, concerning the differences between Catholics and
Protestants in the ways in which they view the world. The data
addresses the consequences of these differences in attitudes toward social problems and other questions. This data seemingly
refutes the notion thatJustice Scalia's jurisprudential style is typically Catholic; if anything, it points to Justice Murphy as the more
representative model. Although the primary concern here is with
empirical evidence, it will be helpful to briefly discuss theologian
David Tracy's theoretical work, which provides much of the background for Greeley's empirical study.' 0 0
A.

The Theory: David Tracy and the "Analogical Imagination"

It is common to regard doctrine, creedal statements or rules
as the core of religion. Yet many students of religion have concluded that these, however important, are derived from the true
core. That core is the experience of an ultimate reality and the
perceived need to understand and communicate it.101 The process of translation from experience to communication will require
"imagination," that is, the power to create images, symbols and
stories. The listener, accepting those stories or images as making
sense in light of his or her own experience, now has a framework
02
for understanding reality.
The fundamental Christian experience, of course, is the Incarnation, the experience by the first Christian community of
Christ himself. That experience is intensely paradoxical. God is
present in the world, but at the same time beyond it. God affirms
the goodness of creation, but at the same time insists on its im99. Kannar quotes Garry Wills, William F. Buckley, Mario Cuomo and Mary
McCarthy to establish "a specifically Catholic tendency to attach a special importance to words." Kannar, supra note 14, at 1315. However distinguished, the
reminiscences of a few people do not comprise a valid sample of a population.
100. DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
AND THE CULTURE OF PLURALISM (1986). Greeley discusses how Tracy's work,
and that of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, helped to provide the theoretical underpinnings for his empirical research. GREELEY, supra note 11, at 34-36.
101. TRACY, supra note 100, at 405-07; see also GREELEY, supra note 11, at 39.
Greeley states that "[r]eligion, both in the life of the individual and in the great
historical traditions, was then experience, symbol, story . . . and community
before it became creed, rite, and institution. The latter were essential, but derivative." Id.
102. Thus, Greeley summarizes and paraphrases Geertz: "[R]eligion is a set
of symbols that provide explanation for the ultimate problems of life and templates for responding to those problems." GREELEY, supra note 11, at 36.

HeinOnline -- 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1348 1992

1992]

CATECHISM OR IMAGINATION

1349

perfection. 0 3 This relationship of God and the world, what
Tracy calls "real-similarities-in-real-difference," 0 4 or "not yet,
yet even now,"' 1 5 will inevitably lead those attempting to translate the experience to two different types of emphases and two
different "conceptual languages."
Analogy, the first "language" or "imagination," will usually
emphasize similarities; that is, the ways God is manifest in the
world.' 0 6 While negations of the world will remain essential to
preventing this concept from degenerating into the "merely affirmative,"' 0 7 an analogical theology "will ordinarily focus upon
the religious experience of trust, wonder, giftedness" and on "the
possible order and ... emerging harmony" in the variety of creation.' 0 8 When done well, this analogical theology produces a
rich, but rather untidy, interpretation of reality:
[T]he likenesses discovered in variety, the emerging harmony discovered in order are produced by the presence
of those moments of intensity, the necessary negations:
similarity-in-difference, the negation of any univocity,
the manifestation of the event in sheer giftedness, the
concealment in every disclosure, the absence in every
presence, the incomprehensibility in every moment of
genuine comprehensibility, the radical mystery empow09
ering all intelligibility.
The second theological language is the dialectical. This language
focuses on the "real differences," the "not yet." It is significantly
more skeptical of the world, wary of any "poisonous dreams of
establishing any easy continuities between Christianity and culture" and insistent on fidelity to "the Word of Jesus Christ: a
word disclosing the reality of the infinite, qualitative distinction
between that God and this flawed, guilty, sinful, presumptuous,
self-justifying self."" l0 Thus, the clarity of the Word, and the
firmness of its negation of the world, stand in contrast to the analogical imagination.
103. TRAcv, supra note 100, at 407-34. As Tracy notes, "the event ofJesus
Christ" presents the fundamental paradox of a God who is "personlike yet transpersonal," present yet hidden. Id. at 430-31.
104. Id. at 409.
105. Id. at 431.
106. Id. at 408.
107. Id. at 409.
108. Id. at 413.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 415.

HeinOnline -- 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1349 1992

1350

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1329

It is immediately obvious that the description of the analogical imagination is closer to the classic image of Catholic thought,
and that the dialectical imagination is closer to Protestant
thought. But is this distinction borne out today in the actual experience of the Catholic and Protestant communities? Surely,
there is reason to think that it might not be. After all, contemporary Protestantism includes not only the legacy of Barth, but also
the liberal Protestantism of the last century.'
Furthermore, as
Tracy himself points out, Catholic theology has seen the richness
of analogy "yield[ ] in the neo-Scholastic manuals to the clear and
distinct, the all-too-ordered and certain, the deadening, undisclosive and untransformative world . . . of a manualist Thomism
committed to certitude, not understanding, veering toward
1 2
univocity, not unity-in-difference." '
Thus, the question whether a distinction remains between
Catholic and Protestant thought still exists. Accepting the existence of two sharply different styles of religious imagination, and
accepting the likelihood that such styles likely spill over into styles
ofjurisprudence, is there any reason to believe that either style of
thought is more typical among twentieth century American
Catholics? Specifically, ifJustice Scalia is largely a product of the
"neo-Scholastic manuals" to which Tracy refers, is his style of
thought empirically typical of Catholics?
B.

The Data: Andrew Greeley's Work on the Catholic Religious
Imagination

Tracy's description of the analogical and dialectical imagination provides the background for the empirical work of Andrew
Greeley.' ' 3 In actuality, is the analogical imagination reflected in
the classics of Catholic theology more likely present in twentieth
century Catholics than in other denominations? Or, as many
would suspect, has secularization led to homogenization, so that
these styles of thought are no longer more likely to be reflected in
one or another denomination? Or can we go even further, and
assert that contemporary Catholics are disproportionally dialectical "manualist[s] ...committed to certitude, not understanding,
111. Thus, the analogical imagination is present "in all the major Liberal
and 'post-liberal' Protestant theologies from Schleiermacher to contemporary
process theologies," as well as "early twentieth-century Catholic modernists and
their successors." Id. at 412.
112. Id. at 413 (footnote omitted).
113. For a further discussion of the backround for Greeley's research, see
supra note 11.

HeinOnline -- 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1350 1992

19921

CATECHISM OR IMAGINATION

1351

veering towards univocity, not unity-in-difference"?1 4
After surveying respondents in the United States and six
other countries, Greeley concluded that "Catholics are more
likely than Protestants to see God as an intimate other-lover,
friend, spouse and mother-and the world and human nature as
basically good" than are Protestants." 15 When asked to describe
God as either father or mother, as either king or friend, large majorities of both Catholics and Protestants opted for father and
king, which is unsurprising in light of traditional Christian theology. More Catholics than Protestants, however, described God as
mother and friend. 1 6 The difference was statistically insignificant
among respondents age forty and over, but twenty-seven percent
of Catholics under age forty, as opposed to nineteen percent of
Protestants under age forty, chose the warmer "mother and
17
friend" image."
How does this warmer image of God, and more accepting image of the world and human nature, correlate with styles of
thought concerning moral, social and legal questions? A number
of Greeley's findings stand out as particularly interesting in terms
of their relevance to judicial decision-making. Consistently, these
findings suggest that rigidity, literalism and intolerance of ambiguity are less likely to be a Catholic approach to moral, social and
legal issues than a Protestant approach to these same issues. Specifically, in all countries surveyed, Catholics were more likely than
Protestants to value "equality" over "freedom" and "fairness"
over "individualism."1 8
Somewhat paradoxically, while
Catholics were more likely than Protestants to support strengthening government authority, they were simultaneously more
likely to support political protest, even violent rebellion, and
more likely to support freedom of the press.' 19 While more likely
than Protestants to support temporary detention of criminal sus114. TRACY, supra note 100, at 413.

115. GREELEY, supra note 11, at 55. The data on the image of God is reported in Andrew M. Greeley, Evidence That a Maternal Image of God Correlateswith
Liberal Politics, 72 Soc. & Soc. RES. 150 (1988).
116. Greeley, 72 supra note 115, at 150.
117. Id.tbl. 2.
118. Andrew M. Greeley, Protestantand Catholic. Is the Analogical Imagination
Extinct?, 54 AM. Soc. REV. 485, 488-94 (1989). All of the findings cited in notes
114-21 are summarized and further discussed in GREELEY, supra note 11, at 3464.
119. Greeley, supra note 118, at 494-97. Greeley notes: "Perhaps the reason is that the Catholic imagination inclines people to expect the government to
be good, modestly and imperfectly good perhaps, but still good. When the flaws
in government become intolerable, those who believe government can be a posi-

HeinOnline -- 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1351 1992

1352

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1329

pects, Catholics were more likely to oppose capital punishment.
In addition, Catholics ranked below Protestants on an overall
measure of support for obedience to positive laws. 120 Thus, on
social attitudes, Catholics seemed more tolerant of ambiguity,
more equalitarian and inclusive, and less committed to a positivistic view of law than Protestants.
The same distinction holds when measuring attitudes less obviously linked to public issues. Catholics surveyed displayed less
moral rigidity than Protestants, less of a tendency to invoke either
the Bible or a church leader when determining life decisions, and
more of a tendency to doubt their own faith and to express anger
with God.' 2 ' Significantly fewer Catholics than Protestants stated
that on the job they would obey orders from their boss, even if
they did not understand them. 122 Thus, as with social values, the
individual moral decisions of Catholics displayed less reliance on
a single source of "positive law" and more comfort with
ambiguity.
It should be emphasized that the primary focus here is not
upon placing Catholics and Protestants somewhere along a "liberal-conservative" continuum, as those terms are commonly used
in American politics and law. While the tolerance and equalitarianism central to the analogical imagination correlate with a wide
range of "liberal" positions on social issues, they also lead
Catholics to be less tolerant than Protestants of behavior which
threatens the family.' 2 3 A basically communitarian outlook will
look askance at behavior which threatens the most treasured of all
communities. Thus, the issue is not whether "liberal" or "conservative" outcomes are reached, but how they are reached. Are
these outcomes, as both types might be, the product of a positivist, literalist approach with little tolerance for ambiguity, or are
they the result of a less rigid view, one much less concerned with
putting all doubts to rest and more tolerant of ambiguity, and
tive good are more likely to take to the streets than those who take it for granted
that government power is always evil." Id. at 497.
120. Id. at 496-97.
121. Id. at 498-99.
122. Id. at 500.
123. Id. As Greeley has stated: "[It is] useless . . .to try to pin the labels
'liberal' or 'conservative' on either denominational heritage. On issues of sexual
morality and family life, Catholics are clearly more 'conservative'. . . . But on
issues of social justice and neighborhood community, they are just as clearly
more 'liberal.' " GREELEY, supra note 11, at 97. But, at least in the United States,
opposition to premarital sex (sex which does not threaten the family unit?) is
now higher among Protestants than Catholics. Id.
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even inconsistency, in search of the ultimate values of fairness
and community?
It should also be emphasized that, as almost always in social
science, the data here speaks in terms of more or less, not in
terms of yes or no. There are many Protestants whose views are
consistent with the analogical imagination, many Catholics whose
views are more dialectical. To say that more Catholics than Protestants favor or oppose a certain position is not to say that a majority of one religion stands in opposition to a majority of
another. It merely means that the level of support in one group is
noticeably different from that in another. Thus, sweeping generalizations are improper. Still, some useful conclusions might be
drawn from this research.
IV.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

What can be learned from all of this? First, the narrow question: Can we view Justice Scalia's analytical style as typically Catholic, a style that might be expected as a natural consequence of a
Catholic upbringing and education? While Professor Kannar
makes a convincing case that Justice Scalia's religious views, as
well as other aspects of his early life (such as the fact that his father was a professor of Romance languages) can be seen to have
shaped his style of thinking, 24 does that mean that the religious
education he received was uniquely likely to produce such a
thinker?
Social science, it has been frequently noted, is far better at
disproving things than it is at proving them. Even in that endeavor, care must be taken to explain what is or is not supported
by the data. Thus, if the phrase "typically Catholic" means that
most Catholics act or think in a certain way, it may be true that
literalism and legalism-the dialectical imagination-is typically
Catholic. But that does not seem to be the claim. Rather, the
claim is thatJustice Scalia's style of thought is typically Catholic in
that it is more prevalent among Catholics than others. The available data simply does not support, indeed it refutes, the notion
that Catholics are more rigorist in their analysis of moral, social
and political issues than Protestants.
In short, the catechism is, on the whole, less important than
the imagination. For one whose basic way of imagining the world
is dialectical, language is likely to be treated in the same manner,
124. Kannar, supra note 14, at 1316-17.
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and, to be sure, many of these people are Catholics. But when
family, school and local parish12 5 have instilled the analogical imagination, the language of the catechism will not destroy it. Comedian George Carlin, in a routine about attending Catholic
schools, talks about the nun who taught his religion class. She
lectured them, from the catechism, on the obligation to receive
Communion at least once during the Easter season, which ends
on Ascension Thursday, forty days after Easter. A hand goes up,
and a student frames an elaborate hypothetical about a Catholic
on a cruise ship who misses the deadline. But then the ship
crosses the international dateline, and it is now Ascension Thursday again.' 2 6 On one level, this story is simply one of a wiseacre.
On another level, it is an example of the analogical imagination,
pointing out ambiguity, surprise and the ultimate inability of rigid
formulas to completely account for the richness of life.
Does Justice Murphy's analogical imagination make him the
"typical" Catholicjurist? Not if one insists on evidence that most
Catholics, or most Catholic judges or lawyers, would share his analytical style. But in the more modest sense that the analogical
imagination is generally more likely to be found among Catholics
than Protestants, Justice Murphy is the more typical Catholic jurist than is Justice Scalia. The analogical imagination is not
merely a characteristic of "high church" theology. 27
At least two objections might be made to these conclusions.
First, Greeley's data was drawn from a sample of Catholics in all
walks of life. It might be argued that the legal profession is likely
to draw disproportionate numbers of those Catholics most committed to dialectical thinking. In light of data establishing that
individuals attracted to law school are more rule-oriented and authoritarian than the average American, this contention is not only
possible, but quite likely. Still, there is no reason to believe that
this is true only, or disproportionately, among Catholics. 12 8 Once
125. Thus, Greeley finds that the declining regard for the official hierarchy
of the church does not result in a weaker religious identity, because the primary
ways in which religion is transmitted are through family (both parents and
spouse) and the local parish. See GREELEY, supra note 11, at 90-105 (Catholic
family network), 144-81 (importance of local parish and school), 182-98 (interaction between relationship with spouse and relationship with God).
126. GEORGE CARLIN, CLASS CLOWN (Atlantic Records Corp. 1972).
127. See Kannar, supra note 14, at 1313. For a discussion of Kannar's distinction between "high church" theology and the understanding of average
Catholics, see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
128. See ALFRED G. SMITH, COGNITIVE STYLES IN LAW SCHOOLS (1979) (col-

lecting data from sampling at 22 American law schools). Of course, law students
differ widely among themselves on these scales. Smith did find noticeable differ-
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again, the point is not that most Catholic lawyers and judges can
be expected to reject rigid dialectical thinking, but rather that
such thinking is less likely to be present (or at the very least, no
more likely to be present) among Catholic than Protestant jurists.
Second, it might be said that the data merely shows that Justice Scalia is not typical of a generation of younger, post-Vatican
II Catholics. Indeed, Kannar's claim is limited to the effect of
Catholic education on Justice Scalia's contemporaries. 1 29 This
objection is somewhat valid; Greeley's data does show that
younger Catholics are more likely than older Catholics to possess
a warmer, "mother and friend" image of God.13 0 But this distinction between older and younger Catholics does not show that
older Catholics are more rigid than older Protestants. Indeed,
the older Catholic image of God is equally likely to be that of
"mother and friend" than is the corresponding Protestant
image. 13'
In surveys conducted fifteen to twenty years ago, which
would have been composed heavily of adults educated before the
more liberal attitudes of Vatican II, Greeley found that quite consistently, Catholics ranked no higher than, and often lower than,
Protestants on measures of authoritarianism; but no lower, and
often higher than, Protestants on measures of moral liberalism
and trust. 13 2 The only type of behavior in which a pattern does
appear of older Catholics acting more rigidly than Protestants,
with younger Catholics moving rapidly toward the more liberal
attitudes of Protestants, is the degree of importance attached to
parental obedience by children.' 3 3 This finding is intriguing.
One would expect childrearing practices to lead to similar attitudes toward social problems; but across a wide range of social
attitudes, data at the very least refutes the notion that older
ences among the schools. Id. at 90-105. It is worth mentioning that Catholic law
schools did not consistently appear above the mean on measures of student authoritarianism or intolerance of ambiguity. Id. at 93 & 97. Of course, a law
school's Catholic affiliation does not indicate that all of its students are Catholic.
129. Kannar, supra note 14, at 1313-19.
130. Greeley, supra note 115, at 152 tbl. 2.
131. Id. For those over age 40, 19% of Catholics and 18% of Protestants
held images of God as "mother and friend." Id. Thus, the trend does not start
from a point where Catholics have a distinctly more traditional view and evolve
to where they are indistinguishable from Protestants. Rather, the trend starts
from a point of no difference to a point where Catholics have a significantly
warmer view of God.
132. GREELEY, supra note 20, at 199-202.
133. See Duane F. Alwin, Religion and ParentalChild-Rearing Orientations:Evidence of a Catholic-ProtestantConvergence, 92 AM. J. Soc. 412 (1986).
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Catholics were distinctly more likely than Protestants to display
the rigorism of the dialectical imagination.
Does any of this really matter? Is it significant whether Justice Scalia, or Justice Murphy or neither can be seen as the typically Catholic jurist? Or is there something unseemly about the
whole enterprise of trying to correlate religious views with judicial style, in light of the constitutional demand for government
neutrality on religious matters? 3 4 Wise or unwise, religion and
other aspects ofjudges' backgrounds inevitably serve as bases for
prediction, not only ofjudges' behavior, but of the likely behavior
of others. If (as seems likely in light of the discussion of religion
during the Justice Thomas nomination process) religious background will continue to be used as a predictor ofjudicial style, an
accurate depiction of backround is certainly better than one based
on demonstrably incorrect stereotypes. 3 5
It does seem to be true that the religious affiliation of
lawmakers has an effect on how they discharge their duties. In
surveying members of Congress, Peter Bensen and Dorothy Williams found correlations between religious views and policy positions, but found that the correlations were primarily not along
denominational lines. Rather the correlations were based on
whether the members of Congress saw religion as legalistic, "people-concerned," "self-concerned" or as something else. 136
Surely, this result is unsurprising; what would be shocking would
be a finding that one's conduct is unaffected by one's conception
of ultimate values.
Thus, the notion that religious values should have no impact
on judicial thinking is wildly unrealistic. It is also self-contradicting; the radical separation of positive law and transcendent
value itself reflects a particular view of religion. 37 Surely, there
134. The U.S. Constitution states that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. For a general discussion of this often forgotten constitutional provision, see Gerard V. Bradley, No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
674 (1987).
135. For a discussion of the role religion played in the nomination ofJustice Clarence Thomas, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
136. PETER L. BENSON & DOROTHY L. WILLIAMS, RELIGION ON CAPITOL
HILL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 107-67 (1982). For a discussion of religious values
and voting on specific issues, see id. at 154-63. For a discussion of the difference
between denominational affiliation, a weak indicator of behavior, and "religious
type," a much better indicator, see id. at 137-39.
137. One of the religious types found by Benson and Williams in members
of Congress was the "self-concerned religionist," "a religious faith that is de-
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are limits. As a maker and interpreter of law in a religiously pluralist community, a judge must always strive to speak in terms of
values and norms that are understandable to those with sharply
differing conceptions of ultimate values.' 3 8 But the universally
accepted duty to justify decisions on something other than the
will of God does not eliminate the fact that religious conceptions
will have some impact on how one approaches legal and social
problems.
A number of observers of American religion have concluded
that religion is an important factor in one's world view. Differences within denominations, between "liberals" and "conservatives," between "analogical" or "dialectical" thinkers, however,
are now far more significant than differences between denominations themselves.' 3 9 Thus, when evaluating "how," not
"whether," religious values are likely to manifest themselves in
the work of a judge or lawmaker, it is highly advisable that we put
aside easy denomination-based assumptions. Perhaps it is unimportant to defend the position that Justice Murphy's analytical
style was in any sense typically Catholic, but there is considerable
value in refuting the same claim about Justice Scalia. At the very
least, it requires analysis beyond denominational labels in looking
at the links between conceptions of religion and conceptions of
law.
There is at least one additional perspective which gives this
discussion value. As mentioned above, it is at least somewhat intriguing that Justice Murphy has not been highly regarded as a
jurist despite having so many of his views subsequently accepted. 40 Might this be at least partly due to a failure to undervoted, visible, articulate, enthusiastically shared, regularly practiced," but "almost entirely concerned with the relationship between the believer and God"
with "relatively little impetus toward concern for fellow creatures." Id. at 128.
138. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239-41 (1988) (arguing that judges "should be extremely wary of
relying on religious convictions," but noting that at times judgments based on
individual religious convictions will be unavoidable).
139. In addition to Benson and Williams, see J. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS:
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1988). For a discussion of the intra-denominational differences that seems particularly interesting in light of the debate over
the Justice Thomas nomination, see Michael R. Welch & David C. Leege, Dual
Reference Groups and Political Orientations: An Examination of Evangelically Oriented
Catholics, 35 AM.J. POL. ScI. 28 (1991).
140. For a discussion of Justice Murphy's reputation as a jurist, see supra
notes 79-82 and accompanying text. A 1970 poll of professors of law, history
and political science rated Murphy an "average" Supreme Court Justice while
his contemporaries Stone, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson and Rutledge

HeinOnline -- 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1357 1992

1358

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1329

stand, or accept as legitimate, the analogical imagination's
approach to social problems? If those who choose law as a profession are generally more likely to think dialectically, and if that
effect is reinforced by the historic fact that American legal culture
has been predominantly Protestant,141 is it really surprising that a
jurist who works from a very different world view will not be seen
as merely expressing an alternative, yet legitimate, conception of
law, but rather as doing law badly, or worse, dishonestly?
Much has been written recently about law as narrative; that
is, the ways in which law tells a story of the lawmaker's view of the
world, and at the same time how the stories about the world that
the lawmaker brings to his or her work shape the law. 1 42 It can be
argued that different conclusions on legal issues are not merely
the result of flawed reasoning or insufficient evidence, but rather
are the inevitable result of judges starting with different assumptions about the way things are. Thus, these different assumptions
lead them to emphasize or focus on different parts of reality.
The dominant "story" in American law would seem to be
based upon the dialectical imagination. It is hardly surprising
that a jurist who gives voice to that imagination, Justice Scalia,
would find his work held in high regard. Perhaps it is time,
though, to accept the legitimacy of a jurisprudential style based
upon the analogical imagination. This idea, of course, is not one
calling for a judiciary made up only of Justice Murphys. Tracy
points out that in theology, the dialectical voice is necessary to
challenge the analogical, as much as the analogical is necessary to
were all rated as "great" or "near great."
PRESIDENTS

HENRY

J.

ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND

app. A at 412-13 (3d ed. 1992).

141. See Levinson, supra note 4. Levinson stated:
For Jews and Catholics alike, then, it seems plausible to argue that
there is a price attached to entry into leadership positions within the
polity. This price has been the modulation, if not outright suppression,
of much awareness of anything within their respective religious traditions that might be significantly different from-let alone pose a challenge to-the wider American (and Protestant?) culture.
Id. at 1058.
142. There has been much discussion recently of the role of "narrative" in
law and legal education. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and
Narrative: CanJudges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991) (discussing the effect of contemporary literature on judicial decisionmaking);
Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1990) (symposium "celebrates storytelling and narrative in legal education"); Symposium: Law and Literature, 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988) (exploring connection between law and
literature). This concept is being discussed in other disciplines as well. See
Thomas Shaffer, Book Review, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 241 (1988) (reviewing JOHN C.
HOFFMAN, LAW, FREEDOM, AND STORY: THE ROLE OF NARRATIVE IN THERAPY, SOCIETY, AND FAITH (1986)).
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leaven the dialectical. 43 Should not it be clear that the same is
true in law?
There may well be factors other than religion that increase
the likelihood that a judge will bring to the bench a less dialectical
imagination. As it becomes more common to see the Supreme
Court dividing into intellectual camps around Justices Scalia and
O'Connor, 44 the question of the impact of gender on analytical
style is likely to become more prominent. 45 But to the extent
that religion correlates with the kind of imagination one brings to
the bench, there is no reason to considerJustice Scalia as a typical
representative of Catholic analytical style. An examination not
merely of "high church" thinking, but of the way Catholics actually do think, shows that Justice Murphy is at least as worthy, perhaps more so, of that distinction.
143. TRACY, supra note 100, at 409-10.
144. For a discussion concerning how this philosophical rift became prominent in the closing weeks of the 1991-1992 term, see supra notes 26-27.
145. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) (discussing "feminine jurisprudence").
Martha Nussbaum suggests that sexual orientation, as well as gender, may be
associated with different styles of thought. Martha Nussbaum, The Softness of Reason, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 13 & 20, 1992, at 26.
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